This paper describes a resolution process for faltering financial firms that quickly allocates losses to bondholders and transfers ownership of the firm to them. This process overcomes the most serious flaws in resolution plans submitted by banks under Dodd-Frank Title I and in the FDIC receivership procedure in Dodd-Frank Title II by restoring the balance sheet of a failing financial institution and immediately replacing the management and board of directors who allowed its demise. In almost all bank failures, this process would eliminate the need for government involvement beyond court certification of the reorganization. The procedure overcomes the serious incentive distortions and inefficiencies that result from bailouts, and avoids the destruction of value and financial market turmoil that would result from the bankruptcies and liquidations that Dodd-Frank requires for distressed and failing banks.
Background
For decades, bailouts have been a standard response when financial firms falter or fail.
National treasuries, central banks, and transnational political entities such as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have, due to the absence of alternative resolution mechanisms, taken responsibility for stabilizing financial systems in many countries over the past decades. Over the past several years, political pressures have built in most developed economies to replace bailouts with 'bail-ins', in which a financial firm's creditors will bear responsibility for losses incurred by the bank if it fails. In the U.S. these procedures are mandated in Title I Section 165(d) and Title II (Orderly Liquidation Authority) of the DoddFrank Act. Although the Dodd-Frank Act is intended to eliminate bailouts, the resolution procedures adopted in it have many of the same flaws that led financial markets to freeze when Lehman Brothers failed and other financial institutions were bailed out in 2008. Title I of the DoddFrank Act requires each systemically important bank to develop detailed plans that specify procedures for its own resolution if it is about to collapse. 2 The resolution strategies submitted to the Federal Reserve and the FDIC to date rely primarily on either (1) a holding company that will sell some of its subsidiaries to recapitalize the remaining entities while the holding company itself files for bankruptcy protection or (2) a "bridge bank" that will receive the high-quality assets of the failing firm and most of its liabilities, leaving some impaired assets and most longterm debt behind when the bank enters bankruptcy. If the resolution process devised by the company in compliance with Title I Section 165(d) is not implemented successfully and in a timely manner, Title II requires the FDIC to take control of the firm in receivership. 3 The receivership process described in Title II confers almost unlimited authority on the government appointed trustees in the event that the voluntary resolution process fails. 4 Criticism has been leveled at the Dodd-Frank for its harshness 5 and for its subversion of constitutionally guaranteed protections. 6 Other legal arguments could be mounted against Dodd-Frank, such as those developed in Hamburger (2014) and in Lawson (2015) to address the expansive authority of administrative agencies. 7 The legal arguments against Dodd-Frank are worth pursuing in their own right, but the argument put forth and emphasized in this paper is that the Dodd-Frank procedures impose unnecessary administrative oversight and authority in the resolution of distressed financial firms: a simpler, less disruptive, more transparent market-oriented process can be implemented that defines and respects rights of the firms' creditors.
One of the serious flaws of the Dodd-Frank Act is that, unlike the bankruptcy code, similarly situated creditors will not necessarily be treated equally, under the banks' own resolution plans or in FDIC receivership. When a bank or the FDIC creates a bridge bank and places assets and some liabilities into it, the creditors whose claims are moved to the successor bank or bridge bank will have claims on a going concern. Effectively, their claims will be protected completely from the consequences of the firm's collapse. The creditors whose claims are left behind in the predecessor bank will have claims that may -like those of the unsecured creditors of Lehman Brothers -incur severe losses. Under Title I resolution plans, allocation of claims to the solvent and insolvent entities will be at the discretion of the bank's management and board of directors;
in Title II liquidation FDIC receivers will decide, with no avenue for judicial review. The challenge of a reorganization regime for large, systemically important financial firms is to balance the need to maintain the core functions of the firm against the goal of giving equal treatment to similarly situated creditors. Our proposal gives precedence to the objective of maintaining the core functions of the firm, but we also avoid the different treatment of similarly situated creditors by creating a class of creditors who know ex ante that they would be called upon to absorb losses but also know that they will be compensated with ownership of the firm after reorganization.
After a brief review of the balance sheet consequences of an asset collapse, I provide a summary of reorganization bonds, which are a private, market oriented resolution procedure that 
Asset Collapse and Insolvency
The diagram on the left side of Figure 1 shows a stylized balance sheet with key asset and liability items for a bank with positive equity. The diagram on the right side of Figure 1 shows the same bank's balance sheet if the value of its assets collapses; in that diagram the bank's equity position disappears and the bank becomes insolvent. A bailout would add cash to the asset side of the balance sheet and more debt to the liability side of the balance sheet, leaving the balance sheet hole the same size. A bailed-out bank typically takes earnings from the healthy portion of its asset portfolio as they come in over the course of many years and moves them to loss reserves so that impaired assets can be removed from the books. During this long period the bank has suppressed earnings to dedicate to dividends, stock buybacks, or organic growth. One consequence of this is that the bank has difficulty finding capital investment, and it will typically deleverage as the only avenue available to it to raise its capital to asset ratio. A method is needed to remove some of the liabilities from the bank's balance sheet. Bankruptcy does that, but at the cost of major disruption to the firm, to financial markets, and to the wider economy. Our proposal achieves the same goal with far less trauma. 
Reorganization bonds
We propose creation of a class of bonds that sits between equity and all other creditors in the hierarchy of firm obligations. These bonds, which we called 'Reorganization' or 'R' bonds in Gjerstad and Smith (2014) , would be converted to equity immediately upon failure of a firm. 8 I want to emphasize that Reorganization bonds differ in a crucial respect from contingent convertible bonds, because we propose that ownership and control of the corporation would pass to the bondholders with conversion of the bonds to equity. This is crucial because contingent convertible bonds simply provide the managers who have failed with a new pool of capital, and profits that the firm accrues after conversion would be shared by the owners of the contingent convertible bonds with incumbent shareholders. 9 Under our proposal, if an asset value collapse causes a firm to run out of equity capital -that is, the firm becomes insolvent -the incumbent equity holders' shares are eliminated, the 'R' bonds are converted to equity, and the holders of the equity that was created by conversion of the 'R' bonds become the sole owners of the firm. Figure 2 shows how 'R' bonds are created from standard long-term debt. 9 Many authors suggest that these bonds could convert to equity if the market capitalization of the firms passes below some threshold, such as 2 percent of the firm's liabilities. When the threshold is crossed, some amount of the bonds would be converted to equity at the market price of equity shares when the threshold was passed. There are at least three significant problems with this approach. One issue is that if the equity price crosses the threshold on its way lower, bond conversion bails out the incumbent shareholders before their shares lose more or all of their value. The second consideration is that these procedures also leave the incumbent management and board in control of the firm. A third problem is that, with the management and board in control of the firm, the new equity holders have minimal protection against the incumbent management and board enriching themselves at the expense of the new equity holders before the new equity holders can wage a fight for control of the firm. For all of these reasons I argue that it would be better to allow the firm to enter a pre-packaged bankruptcy where the bondholders are rewarded with control of the firm. With this structure, 'R' bonds should trade at almost the same price as the bank's standard corporate bonds when the likelihood of failure is near zero, so that a sound bank will face no additional cost of funding with this arrangement. If the bank does become insolvent, then prior equity holder claims are eliminated when 'R' bonds convert to equity. If losses on assets are less than the sum of the pre-crisis book value of equity and the amount of 'R' bonds, then the bank's solvency is restored under our procedure and the reorganization will produce a new equity cushion owned exclusively by the investors whose 'R' bonds were converted. With established criteria that trigger conversion, the ad hoc nature of bailouts, the public funds that support them and their severe incentive distortions can all be eliminated. Conversion of long-term bonds to equity is a key element of our proposal. We propose that, if equity capital is depleted and the firm is on the brink of default, 12% of the firm's liabilities could be converted into equity capital. Table 1 shows the liabilities of the ten largest banks in the U.S. at the end of 2007; it also shows the amount of long-term debt that each one had outstanding. Each of these firms had between 12.6% and 26.4% of their liabilities in the form of long-term bonds, so that each would have been able to meet the threshold for 'R' bond issuance without a substantial change to its financing costs. 
Challenges for Resolution Plans and Orderly Liquidation
Title global financial system by breaking themselves apart and selling the pieces -presumably to other G-SIFIs. Of course, financial distress is highly correlated, so many of the largest financial firms will be turning to one another to raise capital. Even if that were possible, the sale of Lehman
Brothers investment banking and capital market accounts to Barclays in a Section 363 sale in
September 2008 provides insight into the limited capital raised by such sales, and the potential for serious harm to the interests of the seller -in this case the Lehman Brothers estate.
According to the Trustee of the estate, James Giddens, Lehman Brothers transferred assets worth approximately $11,869 million to Barclays. In addition, Barclays gained over 72,000 customer accounts with assets of $43,000 million (about $600,000 per account). 12 McDermott (2010, p. 2) , in an analysis from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP argues that "the potential harshness of the Act ultimately may mean that its most salutary effect will be to minimize the circumstances under which it will, in fact, be used." Lee (2015, p. 453) The time frame for payments to creditors, the scale of the losses, and the ex ante lack of clarity regarding how losses would be allocated to creditors could be disastrous for financial markets in future liquidations as they were with Lehman Brothers.
Conclusions
In this paper I have described a procedure that is capable of addressing the principle challenge of reorganizing failing financial institutions: maintaining the core intermediation and payment functions of the firm, avoiding a fire sale of its assets to cover liabilities, and allocating losses in The procedures could be developed in a new Chapter 14 of the bankruptcy code or in modifications to Chapter 11 for systemically important financial institutions. A great deal of work has been done to plan for the contingency that an important financial firm must enter bankruptcy or be liquidated. It would be good though to avoid those paths with a process that maintains all of the functions of a major financial institution without interruption, and prepositions liabilities that can be dedicated to recapitalize a failing financial firm in a manner that is known ex ante to regulators, to the firm's creditors, and to other market participants.
